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This paper explores the future of unemployment insurance in the Netherlands against the 
background of various social and economic trends. It starts by discussing the literature on 
optimal unemployment insurance. This aims to demonstrate the key trade-offs that the 
government faces in designing unemployment insurance. The optimal unemployment insurance 
strikes a balance between the gains from reduced uncertainty and the costs associated with 
moral hazard effects. The government can adopt a variety of instruments to affect this trade-off, 
including the level and duration of benefits, saving accounts, firing costs and activation policies. 
What constitutes the most desirable future for Dutch unemployment insurance depends on 
circumstances and preferences. Today, the main problem seems the long unemployment spells 
among particular groups, such as the elderly, the low skilled and non-western immigrants. This 
calls for measures that improve the incentives to exit unemployment and measures that increase 
the job-finding probabilities for the unemployed, e.g. through more flexibility in terms of job 
flows. Activation, monitoring and sanctions may complement these policies. In the longer run, 
uncertainties are large. We therefore analyze different directions for reform of unemployment 
insurance in alternative scenarios.  
 
This paper is part of a broader study on the future of the Dutch welfare state that is to appear at 
the end of 2005 (see http://www.cpb.nl/eng/research/sector1/projecten.html#welvaartsstaat for a 
brief description of that project). That study aims to develop comprehensive scenarios for the 
future Dutch welfare state. Unemployment insurance will be part of those scenarios. 
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1  Introduction 
Welfare states in Europe are under pressure. Many countries are in a process of reforming or 
cutting generous welfare state provisions that were developed during the second half of the 
previous century. Today’s reforms are triggered by trends like aging, internationalization and 
the growing heterogeneity in European societies. These developments put a strain on the large 
welfare states and their associated high tax burdens (De Mooij and Tang, 2003). Unemployment 
insurance does not escape this reform process. To illustrate, the German government recently 
decided on a considerable reduction in unemployment benefit duration from a maximum of 32 
to 18 months. Also the Dutch government has reduced benefit extensions for the elderly in 
2003. More recently, it proposed further reforms with respect to entitlement conditions and 
short-term benefits. These reforms call into question where countries will be heading during the 
coming decades.  
This paper explores the future of unemployment insurance in the Netherlands against the 
background of various social and economic trends. To that end, we start by discussing the 
literature on optimal unemployment insurance. This aims to demonstrate the key trade-offs that 
the government faces in designing its unemployment insurance scheme. It is shown that optimal 
unemployment insurance strikes a balance between the social gains from reduced uncertainty 
and the social costs associated with moral hazard effects. The government can adopt a variety of 
instruments to affect this trade-off. Thereby, it should consider unemployment insurance in 
connection with other institutions, such as employment protection legislation, welfare benefits 
and disability insurance. What constitutes the most plausible and most desirable reform in 
unemployment insurance depends on future circumstances and preferences. As these are 
surrounded by considerable uncertainty, we analyze alternative directions for reform in different 
scenarios.  
Optimal unemployment insurance contains many issues. To put these into a broad 
perspective, this introduction starts by briefly reviewing the various components of 
unemployment insurance (see figure 1.1). This provides a guide for reading this article and may 
help to better understand the various issues in sections 2 and 3 of this paper. To start on top of 
figure 1.1, we see that competition in unemployment insurance is unlikely to yield an efficient 
outcome due to various insurance market failures. This will be discussed in section 2.2. It 
provides a rationale for government intervention in unemployment insurance. Moving one step 
down in figure 1.1, we see that the government faces a fundamental trade-off in designing a 
public unemployment insurance scheme. Indeed, the government needs to trade off the gains 
from reduced uncertainty (discussed in section 2.1) and the cost associated with moral hazard 
(discussed in section 2.3).The trade-off materializes in particular with respect to the level and 
duration of benefits and the entitlement conditions (see section 3.1). Also individual saving 
accounts do not escape the trade-off, although this system maintains liquidity insurance as well  
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as (targeted) insurance against low lifetime income (see section 3.2). Moving to the right in 
figure 1.1, we find complementary policies that aim to combat various types of moral hazard, 
without reducing insurance. In particular, introducing firing costs through experience rating or 
employment protection legislation may help to alleviate inefficiencies in layoff decisions. These 
measures, however, exacerbate moral hazard associated with low outflows by reducing job-
finding probabilities (see section 3.3). Eligibility requirements, monitoring and sanctions may 
combat ex-post moral hazard on the side of the unemployed. Yet, they involve high transaction 
costs (see section 3.4). 
Figure 1.1  A readers guide to the optimal design of unemployment insurance 
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→ Eligibility (3.4) 
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After having discussed the trade-off in designing the system of unemployment insurance in 
section 2 and the parameters to affect this trade-off in section 3, section 4 elaborates on the 
evolution of Dutch unemployment insurance. It first discusses the current system and its 
historical development. Then, we explore alternative future developments.   
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2  Costs and benefits of unemployment insurance 
2.1  Benefits from insurance 
The combination of risk aversion and idiosyncratic shocks in unemployment induces demand 
for risk pooling. Insurance against the financial consequences of unemployment may therefore 
yield welfare gains to society. 
Reduced uncertainty 
Risk aversion implies that people prefer a certain income over a (weighted average of) uncertain 
income(s), even if the expected value of the uncertain income is higher than that under 
certainty. Hence, individuals assign a positive value to certainty, a value that rises with the 
degree of risk aversion. This story holds in particular for the risk of becoming unemployed, 
which involves a potentially large financial loss. 
In principle, individuals can save for unemployment. This, however, is typically less 
efficient than risk pooling through insurance. The reason is that people that do not lose their job 
will be inefficiently reducing their current consumption level. Moreover, there are potential 
capital market imperfections for workers trying to smooth their consumption across 
unemployment spells. Therefore, unemployment insurance (UI) may raise welfare by filling a 
missing market for consumption smoothing. 
Individuals can also find implicit insurance against unemployment risk in small 
communities or through family ties. Gifts by relatives or a second income within the family 
reduce the economic consequences of unemployment risk for a household. Implicit insurance 
becomes more relevant to the extent that the share of two-earner families in society grows. An 
alternative way to reduce the risk of (long-term) unemployment is by investing in general skills. 
Indeed, with more general human capital, someone who is dismissed in a declining sector will 
feature a higher job-finding probability in booming sectors. Although these forms of self-
insurance may help to reduce uncertainty, they may not provide sufficient insurance for all 
households against unemployment risk. Individualisation, for instance, may call for more 
explicit insurance as single households cannot benefit from intra-family insurance. Explicit 
unemployment insurance will therefore directly raise utility for risk-averse households.  
Indirect welfare gains 
Apart from these direct welfare gains, UI can also yield indirect social benefits by reducing pre-
existing distortions in the economy. First, job matching can be inefficient for a number of 
reasons. For instance, workers may fail to take into account the impact of their individual search 
behaviour on labour market tightness; or they may not internalize the impact of their job 
acceptance rate on the quality of jobs created. UI can alleviate such distortions (Diamond, 1981;  
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Marimon and Zilibrotti, 1999). For instance, Acemoglu and Shimer (1999) show that 
heterogeneous unemployed individuals searching for work may accept an unsuitable (low 
productive) job if unemployment is accompanied by a large private cost. This will induce the 
unemployed to accept an early job offer that comes available, even if it involves a poor match. 
Unemployment benefits will reduce the private cost of unemployment and, therefore, give the 
unemployed more time to search for a better job-worker match. This improves the quality of job 
matching. In turn, it encourages firms to create more productive jobs as the search costs for 
finding an appropriate employee decline. As a result, UI raises production. More generally, 
reduced uncertainty may raise productivity by stimulating risk taking, e.g. by encouraging 
entrepreneurship, innovation and the flexibility of workers (Sinn, 1996). 
Secondly, UI can reduce pre-existing labour-supply distortions, e.g. because of distortionary 
taxation, due to the so-called entitlement effect (Mortenson, 1977). In particular, not all workers 
or unemployed job seekers are entitled to unemployment benefits. Entitlement is usually 
restricted to people with a sufficient record of contributions from work, while benefits are 
provided only for a limited duration. The unemployed who are not entitled to UI choose 
between voluntary non-participation and searching for work. Unemployment benefits will 
encourage search because employment would make them entitled to benefits in case of a future 
job layoff. In a sense, entitlement to (high) unemployment benefits increases the value of being 
employed compared to be voluntarily outside the labour market. Increased search will raise 
effective labour supply and increase welfare in the presence of labour supply distortions. 
Finally, UI may remove obstacles for efficiency-enhancing policies. Various policies aim at 
raising economic growth by stimulating innovation, competition and the flexibility of the labour 
market. Without unemployment benefits, there may be little public support for such policies. 
The reason is that a more dynamic economy is accompanied by higher job flows. Hence, 
workers bear a higher risk of becoming unemployed. This hurts the interest of insiders. 
Therefore, they can block reforms that aim at promoting flexibility. By protecting individuals 
against the adverse financial implications of a job layoff, UI improves the legitimacy of a 
dynamic market economy and thus supports efficiency-enhancing policies.  
2.2  Market failures and the need for government intervention 
That insurance is welfare improving does not immediately justify social insurance organized by 
the state. Competition among insurers can be attractive to improve the efficiency of the 
insurance market. In particular, compared to a public monopoly, competition among insurers 
provides better incentives to avoid X-inefficiencies in administrations, thereby leading to more 
stringent claim assessments and better monitoring. Competing insurers also face stronger  
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incentives to combat moral hazard.
1 Moreover, competition enables firms to engage in 
international risk sharing. The increasing integration of European capital markets allows for 
more international risk sharing, which helps stabilizing European economies in case of 
asymmetric shocks (Teulings, 1999). However, the insurance market tends to fail due to adverse 
selection and the correlation of risks. Moreover, the market is unable to yield redistribution. 
Therefore, we usually find that UI is organized by the state.
2 This section elaborates on the 
various market failures in more detail. 
Adverse selection 
Without regulation, the free market is unlikely to provide sufficient insurance against the risk of 
unemployment. One reason is adverse selection: some individuals face a higher probability of 
becoming unemployed than others. If unemployment risk depends on non-verifiable 
characteristics of individuals and information about these characteristics is asymmetric, workers 
will self-select themselves. In particular, workers who know that they face a low risk will exit 
the insurance as the private gains do not outweigh the private costs. Hence, only high-risk 
workers will demand insurance. This calls for higher premiums compared to a system with 
complete risk pooling. The increased premium will further drive out the relatively low risk 
workers in the remaining insurance pool. Through this process of self-selection, the private 
market will ultimately break down and no insurance is supplied. 
The government can prevent adverse selection by requiring mandatory insurance of all 
employees. In that case, however, competing insurance companies can still try to exploit the 
selection mechanism, e.g. by offering different packages of premiums and own risk. The low 
risk types will choose a low premium with a high own risk, while the high risk types will 
choose a high premium with a small own risk. As long as such scheme is incentive compatible, 
it may yield a stable separating equilibrium. However, the low-risk types will only receive 
partial insurance as they have to bear a substantial own risk. Adverse selection thus results in 
underinsurance.  
Redistribution 
To the extent that risk profiles depend on verifiable characteristics, private insurance companies 
would be able to solve the asymmetric information problem. In particular, insurers can 
differentiate premiums according to observable characteristics that are correlated with the 
unemployment risk, e.g. educational attainment, the sector where someone is employed, 
 
1 Compared to a public monopoly, competing insurers have better incentives to avoid so-called type II errors, which occur if 
people not eligible for benefits nevertheless receive them. Competition increases, however, the probability of type I errors, 
which occur if people eligible for benefits do not receive them. 
2 In some countries, private insurance against unemployment risk arises from mortgage protection insurance. The interest 
payments on mortgage loans are then insured during a period of unemployment. This type of insurance, however, only 
applies to owner-occupiers. This tends to be a group of good risks, receiving relatively high incomes. Hence, a selection 
process has already occurred. For a discussion, see Beenstock and Brasse (1986).  
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ethnicity, disability, unemployment history, etc. Yet, this separating equilibrium would cause 
low-skilled workers paying higher premiums than high-skilled workers, as the former typically 
face a higher unemployment risk. This runs counter to distributional concerns. Indeed, an 
important reason for public UI is that it redistributes resources across households, with agents 
with little human capital obtaining resources from agents with abundant human capital. Hence, 
UI is not only used for efficiency reasons (i.e. obtaining the benefits from risk pooling), but also 
for equity reasons (ex-ante redistribution). This role of public insurance is not undisputed. 
Indeed, the government could obtain these distributional goals through other instruments as 
well, such as the tax-benefit system. However, if the government lacks more direct verifiable 
information about who has the highest human capital risk, it may find it efficient to use uniform 
UI premiums for redistribution. 
The government can alternatively obtain redistribution by making insurance compulsory, 
requiring insurance companies to set uniform premiums, and to impose mandatory acceptance 
rules.
3 In a sense, the government then prohibits the use of information about individual 
characteristics to differentiate premiums. Yet, insurance companies may still find alternative 
ways to select good risks. Some companies would then end up with many bad risks and some 
with many good risks. To avoid this, there should be explicit transfers between insurance 
companies with many good risks towards insurance companies with many bad risks. However, 
this requires verifiable information on the characteristics of the good and bad risks. If this 
verifiable information is not available, preventing selection is difficult in a market with 
competing insurance companies. 
Correlated risks 
Unemployment risks are correlated as they depend on the business cycle. This renders 
execution by private companies problematic. As the premiums paid by the employed will not 
always cover the benefits received by laid off workers, private insurance companies may not be 
able to meet their commitments at all times. This holds, for instance, during a recession when 
the number of job layoffs increases dramatically. Private insurance companies can then go 
bankrupt. If the public sector provides a bail-out to avoid unacceptable implications for the 
unemployed, this introduces a moral hazard problem on the side of the insurance companies.  
The public sector can always meet its obligations because it can use force. In particular, it 
can force people to finance public deficits, e.g. by raising taxes. Moreover, the government can 
engage in intertemporal risk sharing. Thus, it can run into a deficit during a recession, while 
during a boom it creates a surplus in the unemployment account. The unemployment premium 
can then remain fixed and the unemployment account acts as an automatic stabilizer for the 
 
3 Moral hazard with means tested social assistance could occur if UI were not mandatory. Indeed, the role of the public 
sector as insurer of last resort may induce individuals to buy too little insurance. Moreover, myopic agents may make wrong 
decisions by not realizing the benefits from unemployment insurance. The risk of underinsurance gives a rationale for 
mandatory insurance.   
  8 
economy.
4 This provides an advantage compared to private insurance. Private firms would need 
to accumulate substantial buffers in order to be prepared for the benefit payments during a 
negative macroeconomic shock.
5  
Another argument for social insurance is that the government can affect aggregate 
unemployment through its macroeconomic and microeconomic policies.  In contrast, with 
international risk sharing under private insurance, governments face less incentives to keep 
unemployment low since adverse shocks will be absorbed by foreigners via the capital market. 
This involves a form of moral hazard on the part of the government. Public insurance organized 
by national states does not suffer from this type of moral hazard.  
Exclusivity 
While adverse selection results in underinsurance, moral hazard −  to be discussed in the next 
section −  typically results in overinsurance as long as exclusivity is not enforced. In particular, 
the government insures human capital risk through other schemes as well, such as social 
assistance programmes and redistributive taxation. If private companies provide insurance 
against related human capital risks, they can shift some of the costs of moral hazard unto the 
public insurance. For instance, the private insurance companies may shift the incidence of the 
unemployment risk unto the collective pool if their clients are protected by social welfare 
programmes. To prevent shifting risks from one insurance to another, it is efficient to put all 
insurances in one hand (Pauly, 1974). Indeed, if only one insurer is responsible for containing 
moral hazard, this insurer faces appropriate incentives to prevent excessive moral hazard. The 
insurance contract will thus strike an optimal balance between insurance and incentives to 
combat moral hazard.  
The problem of overinsurance also potentially applies to disability insurance, which is often 
related to unemployment. In particular, if disability insurance would become private, competing 
insurance companies have incentives to shift people to welfare schemes or social UI. 
Exclusivity would mitigate these problems as the incentive for risk shifting disappears. 
2.3  Cost of insurance: moral hazard 
The flip side of the coin of any type of insurance is moral hazard. Although this applies to 
public and private insurance alike, moral hazard is typically more important under public 
insurance. This section discusses various forms of moral hazard associated with public 
unemployment insurance. These forms of moral hazard can be characterized as externalities: 
individual economic agents fail to take into account the welfare implications of their behaviour 
 
4 If the systematic component of the unemployment risk can be separated, the idiosyncratic risk component could potentially 
be insured on the private market.  
5 The creation of such buffers would also affect the intergenerational distribution as future generations would gain at the 
expense of current working generations who have to create these buffers.   
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on others. Moral hazard in UI typically causes a too high level of unemployment, too many 
benefit recipients and too little production. 
Inefficient layoff decisions 
With zero firing costs, firms do not take into account the cost of UI in deciding about a job 
separation. Indeed, unemployment benefits are paid from general premiums. Therefore, a layoff 
imposes an external cost on others that firms do not incorporate in their layoff decision. As a 
result, firms too easily use UI as an exit route for redundant workers (Blanchard and Tirole, 
2004). Feldstein (1976) shows that inefficient layoff decisions are particularly important in the 
US where temporary job layoffs constitute a major share in UI schemes (see further below). If 
firms would internalize the external cost of a job layoff, they would put more efforts to prevent 
this so that inflows into unemployment would fall. For instance, firms could invest in their 
employees by means of training or (re-)schooling in order to raise their productivity. Moreover, 
they could undertake economic activities during low-peak seasons so as to prevent temporary 
layoffs. 
Underinvestment in general human capital 
Ex-ante, unemployment benefits may induce workers to shirk on the job since it makes a 
dismissal less costly. For the same reason, people may reduce investments in general skills as 
an alternative insurance device against the risk of long spells of unemployment. Thus, UI 
reduces the job finding probabilities of workers in other sectors, thereby increasing 
unemployment spells. If general human capital becomes more important, e.g. in a more 
dynamic economy with higher job mobility, this form of moral hazard makes UI more costly.  
Tax distortions 
Social unemployment benefits are usually financed by insurance premiums that take the form of 
payroll taxes paid by employers and employees. As these premiums are uniform, the schemes 
contain an important component of risk solidarity. Indeed, high-risk agents pay the same 
premium as low-risk agents. As a consequence, the value of the insurance rights exceeds the 
actuarial premium for the high-risk agents, which especially involves the low skilled. This 
induces an entitlement effect: it makes labour supply more attractive for the low skilled since 
entitlement to unemployment benefits raises the value of a job. For low-risk agents, however, 
cross subsidies from high skilled to low skilled workers give the insurance premium the 
character of a tax. Indeed, the value of insurance rights for low-risk agents is smaller than the 
premium paid. Like other taxes on income, the UI premiums therefore distort labour supply of 
high-skilled workers. Empirical evidence reveals that especially labour supply of women is 
responsive to financial incentives, while men respond only mildly in their hours worked (see 
e.g. Jongen and Van Vuuren, 2004, for an overview).   
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Unemployment benefits in general equilibrium 
Using the MIMIC model, we explore the labour-market impact of a 10%-point reduction in unemployment benefits in a 
general equilibrium context for the Netherlands. We consider a simulation in which we also reduce welfare benefits to 
the unemployed that are obliged to search for work. 
MIMIC contains various mechanisms through which the replacement rate affects the labour market (Graafland et al., 
2001). For instance, the benefit level affects the outcome of wage negotiations, whereby the elasticity is drawn from 
Graafland and Huizinga (1999). Moreover, the model contains search behaviour of the unemployed and models the 
reservation wage in a job matching framework. Through these channels, unemployment benefits exert additional effects 
on  the  labour  market  (see  more  about  search  distortions  below).  Also  labour  supply  distortions  induced  by 
unemployment premiums are captured by the model. MIMIC, however, does not contain endogenous layoff decisions, 
the incentives on human capital accumulation and risk taking, the entitlement effect, and compliance issues.  
The table below shows the simulation results. We assume that lower benefits save on public expenditures and thus 
improve the government budget. We see that employment expands by 0.5% and unemployment falls by 0.38% of the 
labour force. The average replacement rate drops by 4.14%. This suggests a semi-elasticity of unemployment with 
respect to the replacement rate of 0.09. This elasticity is slightly smaller than the aggregate reduced-form elasticity 
found by Layard et al. (1991). Using a panel of countries between 1983 and 1989, they report that a 1%-point higher 
replacement rate raises the unemployment rate by 0.17%-point. Using a slightly longer time frame, Scarpetta et al. 
(1996) find a smaller elasticity of 0.13.  
Note that lower benefits create a social cost in terms of less solidarity. In a dynamic sense, however, lower benefit levels 
may also increase welfare for a number of unemployed individuals since it increases job opportunities (Bovenberg et al., 
2000). Yet, these welfare gains will not apply to those suffering from long spells of unemployment.  
 
Effects of a 10%-point reduction in unemployment benefits in the Netherlands according to MIMIC 
   
  Relative changes 
Wages   − 0.39 
Employment  0.50 
Labour supply  0.03 
   
  Absolute changes 
Unemployment rate  − 0.38 
Net average replacement rate  − 4.14 
Government budget in % NNI  0.34 
   
Source: own calculations with MIMIC     
 
 
Excessive wage claims 
Labour market imperfections arise if employees have market power in determining wages. 
Unemployment benefits can exacerbate these imperfections by strengthening the bargaining 
position of workers (or trade unions) in wage negotiations. Indeed, high benefits improve the 
reservation wage of workers in wage negotiations. As a result, they increase wages and the rate 
of unemployment.   
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Empirical evidence on the impact of replacement rates on wages confirm this mechanism. For 
instance, Van der Horst (2003) finds significant effects of replacement rates on wages and 
unemployment for France, the Netherlands and the UK. In an earlier study for the Netherlands, 
Graafland and Huizinga (1999) show that the impact of the replacement rate on wages is 
correlated with the level of unemployment. In particular, if the unemployment rate is high, the 
level of unemployment benefits is important for wages. The reason is that workers face a high 
chance of being laid off while the unemployed find it difficult to get a job. Hence, the outside 
option depends more on unemployment benefits and less on the market wage. If the 
unemployment rate is low, wages respond only little to changes in the replacement rate. On 
average over the sample period 1965-1993, the estimates by Graafland and Huizinga suggest a 
wage elasticity of the replacement rate of 0.2. The estimates form the basis for the calibration of 
CPB’s applied CGE model for the Dutch labour market (see Box “Unemployment benefits in 
general equilibrium”). Kranendonk (2004) adopts a similar approach, using more recent data for 
the Netherlands. His elasticity of the replacement rate ranges between 0.1 in the early 1970s 
(when unemployment was low) and 0.5 in the late 1980s (when unemployment was high). On 
average over the sample 1970-2002, he reports an elasticity of 0.28. 
Reduced search 
Ex-post moral hazard occurs if the unemployed face little incentives to search for a new job or 
to accept job offers. Job search models in the tradition of Mortenson (1977) reveal that higher 
unemployment benefits indeed tend to raise the reservation wage of the unemployed, thereby 
reducing exit rates out of unemployment and causing longer unemployment duration. Long 
unemployment duration is especially bad if human capital depreciates more quickly over the 
unemployment spell.  
Empirical evidence confirms the impact of UI on unemployment duration for a number of 
countries. Yet, there is little agreement about the magnitude of the effect. Layard et al. (1991), 
for instance, report that an increase in the benefit level by 1% raises unemployment duration by 
between 0.2 and 0.9%. Atkinson and Micklewright (1991) note, however, that the findings from 
the empirical literature are far from robust, while the size of the effect seems relatively modest. 
In a more recent survey, Krueger and Meyer (2002) conclude that an elasticity of 
unemployment duration with respect to the benefit level of 0.5 represents a reasonable summary 
estimate of the literature. Earlier studies for the Netherlands with data for the 1980s suggest no 
significant impact of changing benefit levels on unemployment duration (Van den Berg, 1990). 
In analyzing the impact of sanctions in unemployment benefits, however, Abbring et al. (2000) 
argue that it is unlikely that there has been no such impact in the 1990s.  
Overall, our reading of the literature is that benefit levels do affect unemployment duration, 
but that the magnitude of the effect is surrounded by considerable uncertainty.   
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Non-compliance 
A form of moral hazard that is closely related to job search is abuse or fraud. UI is designed to 
cover the income loss of individuals who experience the bad luck of a job separation. To be 
eligible for benefits, people should “not only be out of work, but also be able to enter work at 
short notice and undertake active steps to find work” (ILO/OECD definition). Hence, UI is not 
meant for individuals who voluntarily quit their job. However, governments are often unable to 
distinguish between voluntary and involuntary unemployment. This opens opportunities for 
individuals who voluntarily quit their job to collect unemployment benefits, despite that they do 
not meet the eligibility criteria (type II error). Especially in modern labour markets, 
characterized by heterogeneous jobs and flexible work patterns and life cycles, it is increasingly 
difficult to distinguish between voluntarily job quits and involuntary layoffs. For instance, 
flexible workers may occupy different jobs with fixed term contracts. After finishing such a job, 
they may be discouraged to accept another if they receive generous unemployment benefits 
instead. Also dismissed older workers may collect unemployment benefits without being 
available for work on the labour market. These forms of moral hazard raise the costs and hurt 
the legitimacy of UI. 
Surveys on non-compliance in the Netherlands suggest that it is important. Indeed, 25% of 
the unemployed in the Netherlands undertake too few job applications while 15% fails to accept 
suitable job offers (Verkoren et al., 2002). Empirical studies for the US suggest that a high 
benefit level attracts more people to the unemployment scheme. In particular, on the basis of a 
literature review Krueger and Meyer (2002) show that, conditional on unemployment or a job 
separation, the level of unemployment benefits raises the frequency of UI claims. They 
conclude that an elasticity of 0.5 is a reasonable summary of the available evidence. This is 
consistent with more voluntarily job quitters claiming unemployment benefits if benefit levels 
increase.
6  
3  Designing an optimal unemployment insurance scheme 
A proper welfare analysis of UI requires a unified treatment of all the insurance benefits and all 
the adverse incentive effects induced by the various moral hazard problems. Moreover, it 
should ideally consider all the institutional features in optimizing the scheme, and include all 
possible general equilibrium effects induced by these institutions. There is no model capturing 
all possible mechanisms and instruments, however. Yet, a number of studies have focused on 
the most important trade-offs in case of separate features of the UI scheme and particular 
incentive effects. This section discusses this literature by analyzing four parameters in the 
 
6 Alternatively, high benefits may induce individuals to search for work in order to meet the eligibility requirements for 
receiving benefits  
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system of UI.
7 These include (i) the benefit level and duration; (ii) compulsory saving accounts; 
(iii) firing costs; and (iv) monitoring and sanctions.  
3.1  Level and duration of benefits 
The trade-off between insurance and incentives applies in particular to the key parameters in UI 
schemes, namely the level and duration of benefits. Moreover, the entitlement conditions also 
meet this trade-off, especially for particular groups of workers.  
Optimal level 
If there were no moral hazard or transaction costs, full insurance against unemployment risk 
would be optimal. In that case, the optimal replacement rate is 100% (thereby taking into 
account the value of leisure, other costs of work, and other benefits of work). In practice, 
however, various forms of moral hazard cannot be avoided. This renders it optimal to provide 
less than full insurance. A replacement rate below 100% implies, for instance, that workers face 
better incentives to avoid unemployment by increasing work effort and bidding for lower 
wages. Moreover, it raises the exit rates out of unemployment by stimulating the search effort 
of the unemployed and making them less reluctant to accept job offers. Indeed, the empirical 
evidence discussed above reveals that the level of unemployment benefits raises the 
unemployment rate.  
The optimal level of unemployment benefits thus strikes a balance between the gains from 
insurance and the incentives to reduce moral hazard. The optimal balance depends, among 
others, on the degree of risk aversion, the leisure value of unemployment, and the magnitude of 
the incentive effects induced by unemployment benefits. Using a stylized search-matching 
model, Holmlund (1998) suggests that the optimal replacement rate would be around 60% for 
high values of risk aversion and around 50% for lower values. Using a similar approach, Gruber 
(1997) argues that current benefit levels are only optimal for implausibly high values of relative 
risk aversion. Note that these calculations focus on the efficiency aspects of UI alone. If value 
of (ex-ante) redistribution from people with abundant human capital (low risk) to those with 
little human capital (high risk) matters for the optimal balance, then higher benefit levels may 
be optimal. Hence, the optimal replacement rate in society will differ across individuals, across 
countries and across time, depending on circumstances and preferences. In most OECD 
countries, the unemployment benefit level lies broadly between 50% and 90% of the last earned 
wage. Figure 3.1 reveals that benefit replacement rates are relatively high in Scandinavian 
countries and relatively low in the US. Other EU countries take an intermediate position. Across 
time, OECD (2002a) reports that between 1960 and 1995, the average gross replacement rate in 
the OECD has more or less doubled. 
 
7 See also Holmlund (1998), Fredriksson and Holmlund (2003) and Van Ours (2003) for recent overviews.  
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Figure 3.1  Net replacement rates in a selection of OECD countries, 1999 














Source: Benefits and Wages −  OECD Indicators, 2002 
 
Optimal sequencing 
Shavell and Weiss (1979) were among the first to formalize the trade-off between the traditional 
benefits of insurance and the moral hazard effects associated with lower job search intensity by 
the unemployed. They show that it is optimal for unemployment benefits to decline over the 
spell of unemployment. In particular, declining benefits provide better incentives for the 
unemployed entitled to benefits to increase their search effort and to reduce their reservation 
wage. That reservation wages fall and exit rates rise when unemployment benefits approach 
their expiry date is supported by ample empirical studies using micro data (for a review of the 
international literature, see Holmlund, 1998). Recently, Lalive and Zweimuller (2004) find that 
the increase in unemployment benefit duration in Austria from 30 to 209 weeks has reduced the 
transition rate into work by 17%, and increased unemployment duration by 9 weeks. For the 
Netherlands, Lindeboom and Theeuwes (1993) report a strong impact of benefit duration on 
exit rates in the early 1980s: a reduction in benefit duration by 1 week reduces unemployment 
duration by 1.3 weeks. Also cross-country evidence suggests that benefit duration raises the rate 
of unemployment (Layard et al., 1991; Nickel and Layard, 1999; Nickel et al., 2002; De Groot 
et al., 2004). 
The optimality of monotonically declining unemployment benefits has been largely 
accepted among economists, although some studies have put qualifications on the result. In 
particular, the optimality result originates from models that emphasise ex-post moral hazard, i.e. 
adverse incentives on the unemployed to exit unemployment. Models concentrating on ex-ante  
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moral hazard, causing excessive inflows, arrive at different conclusions. For instance, Wang 
and Williamson (1996) include work effort in the Shavell-Weiss framework as an endogenous 
variable affecting the probability of workers to be laid off. In this setting, it is no longer optimal 
to have monotonically declining unemployment benefits. Instead, it is optimal to set low 
unemployment benefits in the period just after the job layoff since this encourages workers to 
increase their work effort so as to prevent unemployment. Cahuc and Lehmann (1997) add 
another argument for non-declining unemployment benefits by allowing for endogenous wage 
setting in a trade-union framework. In their model, the benefit level of the short term 
unemployed is relevant for the threat point of the trade union and, therefore, for wage pressure. 
A declining time sequence that favours the short-term unemployed is less attractive in this 
model because it raises wages compared to a flat unemployment benefit scheme. Fredriksson 
and Holmlund (2001), however, show that for plausible parameters, this latter effect is unlikely 
to dominate the impact via the search behaviour of the unemployed. Moreover, they add that 
high unemployment benefits during the early stage of unemployment increases the search effort 
among those unemployed who are currently not entitled to UI.  
The qualifications may overturn the optimality of declining benefit levels over the 
unemployment spell if ex-ante moral hazard would be more important than ex-post moral 
hazard.
8 This would be the case if the problem with unemployment benefits is primarily 
associated with excessive inflows, rather than with too small outflows. High inflows do not 
seem to be the major problem in most EU countries, including the Netherlands. In particular, 
European countries featuring the highest inflows generally face lower unemployment rates (the 
correlation coefficient between inflows and the unemployment rate equals − 0.24 for 14 OECD 
countries). For instance, the right-hand side of figure 3.2 shows that the Anglo-Saxon countries 
typically have relatively high inflows into UI but low unemployment rates, while the Southern 
European countries have relatively low inflows but a high rate. As a result, inflows are 
negatively correlated with unemployment duration (the correlation coefficient between inflows 
and the share of long-term unemployment is − 0.23). Hence, the high incidence of long-term 
unemployment in many European countries (see the left-hand side of figure 3.2) suggests that 
the main problem is due to small outflows rather than due to high inflows. Indeed, while 
inflows into unemployment in Southern Europe is the lowest, unemployment duration is among 
the highest. If moral hazard particularly refers to low outflows, the optimality of declining 
benefit levels seems to apply in particular to Europe. 
 
8 The qualifications suggest that a penalty payment on entry into unemployment may be an attractive supplement to the 
benefit scheme to combat ex-ante moral hazard. It could take the form of a waiting period before unemployment benefits are 
paid out. Such a penalty discourages shirking and moderates wage claims by reducing the bargaining position of workers. 
Moreover, a waiting period could save on fixed administration costs of UI by reducing the inflow of temporary layoffs into the 
benefit scheme.  
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Figure 3.2  Share of long-term unemployment in % of total unemployment (right) in 2003, and inflow into UI 
in % of the labour force (left), average for the period 2000 - 2002 


































> 6 m > 12 m  
Source: OECD Employment Outlook 2004 
Although the qualitative result regarding declining benefits over the unemployment spell is well 
established, it is more difficult to specify the optimal time profile. It depends on the incentive 
effects of the benefits during different phases of the unemployment spell: a steep reduction in 
benefits will impose stronger incentives to leave unemployment. However, it also implies less 
insurance for people who are unable to find work within a short period. A reform towards 
declining unemployment benefits in France reveals that the incentive effects may not improve if 
benefit reductions are imposed only gradually. Indeed, sharp reductions seem more effective in 
raising exit rates from unemployment than gradually declining benefit schemes (see Ministry of 
Social Affairs and Employment, 2004).  
Most OECD countries adopt a declining sequencing of benefits. In particular, UI is usually 
of limited duration, after which the unemployed have to rely on welfare benefits. These are 
usually lower than unemployment benefits, are unrelated to the last earned wage, and means 
tested on household income. The duration of UI differs among countries. It ranges from 6 




An issue closely related to the level and duration of unemployment benefits is entitlement 
conditions. In principle, it is desirable to insure all individuals against the risk of 
unemployment, even if they have a short unemployment history. Yet, if monitoring and 
verification of claims is costly, this would allow for substantial abuse of the insurance by 
workers who voluntarily quit their job after a short period of employment or by firms who lay 
off workers during low-peak seasons. To reduce such inflows, governments usually adopt 
 
9 Note that there is an extended benefit program in the US, extending the potential duration of benefits up to 13 weeks when 
aggregate unemployment rises, i.e. during a recession. 
10 Entitlement conditions restrict the inflow into unemployment schemes, usually by requiring a sufficient record of 
contributions from work. Hence, it focuses on regulating inflows. In contrast, eligibility conditions focus on encouraging 
outflows from unemployment by restricting benefits to unemployed who actively search for work and who meet several 
administrative requirements, see Grubb (2000) for a discussion.  
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conditions in which entitlement depends on employment history, e.g. the number of years in 
employment, or the number of working days during the year before the job separation. More 
stringent entitlement conditions combat this form of moral hazard and thus reduce the inflow 
into unemployment. However, it also implies less insurance for individuals with a short 
employment record, which especially concerns young people. Hence, entitlement conditions 
meet the same trade-off between insurance and incentives, albeit for more specific groups.  
Summing up 
Long unemployment duration and small inflows suggest that ex-post moral hazard (too small 
outflows) is a more important problem in many European countries than ex-ante moral hazard 
(too high inflows). Under these circumstances, unemployment benefits that decline over the 
spell of unemployment then tend to be optimal. Declining benefits provide incentives to exit 
unemployment so that unemployment duration falls. Empirical evidence finds a robust effect of 
benefit duration on the level and duration of unemployment. The benefit level tends to be 
positively correlated with unemployment as well.   
3.2  Saving versus insurance  
An alternative way to improve incentives is by giving households more responsibility for 
financing unemployment benefits. To that end, insurance can partially be replaced by individual 
savings. Although this does not escape the trade-off between insurance and incentives, it 
maintains some important benefits from insurance.  
Individual saving accounts 
With individual saving accounts −  applied in for instance Singapore −  part of the UI premium 
is replaced by a mandatory contribution that is credited to an individual public saving account 
on which a person receives interest. During a period of unemployment, individuals are allowed 
to collect funds from the account for consumption. If a person is short of funds, it can borrow 
from the government at the same interest rate. Thus, the saving account provides liquidity 
insurance, which is important in the presence of capital market imperfections. Indeed, people 
are usually unable to borrow against future earnings. Individuals who end up with a positive 
account at the end of their working life are allowed to increase their pensions or transfer it to 
relatives. Individuals will be bailed out if they end up with a negative account at their pension 
age or when they die. This latter involves insurance against the risk of low lifetime income. It 
implies that a tax-financed share of social insurance remains necessary when a system of  
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individual accounts is introduced. The mandatory character of savings is necessary to combat 
moral hazard with the public bail out.
11 
Efficiency gains from saving accounts 
If the unemployed have to finance their consumption during unemployment from their own 
saving account, they face better incentives to search for work, accept a job and move back into 
employment. Indeed, the unemployed completely internalize the cost of unemployment benefits 
and have no incentive to increase in an inefficient way the frequency or duration of 
unemployment spells. Moreover, by introducing an actuarial link between premiums and the 
exclusive individual rights to withdraw money from the account, the system does not 
necessarily cause disincentives to labour supply.
12 The bail out of those with a negative balance, 
however, maintains the moral hazard problem with the group that relies on public support. 
Indeed, these individuals face little incentive to find work as additional unemployment has no 
personal cost.  
Compared to social insurance, individual saving accounts provide more efficient liquidity 
insurance. Indeed, it is typically more efficient to remove capital market imperfections (or 
undersavings due to hyperbolic discounting) through compulsory savings and loans than via 
redistribution that requires distortionary taxes.
13 Moreover, individual saving accounts maintain 
a targeted form of insurance against low lifetime income due to unemployment. This improves 
efficiency compared to social insurance. The reason is that the government no longer 
redistributes among individuals with high lifetime incomes, which is largely a form of income 
smoothing via the public budget. Indeed, those who become temporarily unemployed have to 
rely on their individual accounts rather than on social insurance. Hence, public redistribution is 
reduced and tax distortions are lowered. Intuitively, exploiting information about lifetime 
income is efficiency improving since these incomes are more equally distributed than annual 
incomes are. Indeed, Nelissen (1998) finds that lifetime income in the Netherlands is 35% less 
unequally distributed than annual income (as measured by the Theil coefficient). This is similar 
to what has been found for other countries. This more equal distribution of lifetime income 
opens the opportunity for a reduction in public redistribution and a lower tax burden, without 
decreasing the protection for those with low lifetime incomes.   
One problem with individual saving accounts is that agents who may be bailed out face 
worse incentives to exit unemployment than under social insurance. Indeed, targeting support to 
 
11 Benefit duration in the Netherlands increases with employment history. This reflects a kind of saving component in the 
unemployment scheme: the longer someone has paid premiums, the longer he/she can claim benefits in the event of 
unemployment. An important difference with saving accounts is that there is no opportunity for workers to claim funds 
without being unemployed. 
12 Because of the mandatory character of saving accounts, labour supply incentives may still be distorted if people are 
forced to save more than they would voluntarily do. 
13 This argument is similar to the efficiency gains associated with a switch from transfers to loans to students, see e.g. 
Jacobs and Canton (2003).  
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this group involves a very high marginal tax rate on wage income for these people. This 
illustrates a fundamental trade-off: targeting support to specific groups reduces moral hazard 
with the majority of the population, but exacerbates moral hazard with the targeted group. To 
remove this latter form of hazard, strict monitoring and sanctions are necessary to complement 
targeted policies. 
Distributional effects of saving accounts 
Bovenberg and Sorensen (2003) find that the introduction of individual saving accounts can be 
a Pareto improving policy. Their model contains three types of agents, and sufficient 
instruments to compensate households that would possibly suffer from the introduction of 
saving accounts. If heterogeneity becomes larger and the number of instruments is limited, 
however, it is unlikely that the system of individual saving accounts can prevent losses in 
lifetime income for all individuals.  
A key parameter for the distributional impact of individual saving accounts is the mandatory 
contribution rate (and the maximum required account balance when applicable). If the 
contribution rate is low, most people who suffer from unemployment will end up with a 
negative balance at the end of their career. Hence, they will be bailed out and their 
unemployment benefits have to be financed by a relatively high insurance tax. If the mandatory 
premium is high, people are more likely to end up with a positive balance. Accordingly, the 
number of people receiving a bailout becomes smaller and the insurance tax can fall. As long as 
we abstract from (i) the positive implications of behavioural responses on the insurance tax and 
(ii) benefit levels are not cut, the sum of the insurance tax and the mandatory contribution rate 
always exceeds the insurance premium under a social system.
14 This has implications for the 
distribution of income. In particular, individuals with a negative balance suffer from a lower 
lifetime income, despite the bailout. The reason is that they have paid higher contributions to 
the saving account during work, but do not benefit from this in the form higher pensions. 
Indeed, these savings have been used to cover the unemployment benefits.
15 Also some people 
with a positive balance will suffer from lower lifetime incomes. In particular, the net present 
value of premiums under the new system (tax plus contribution) will always exceed the 
contributions under the old system (where premiums are lower). As unemployment benefits are 
assumed to be equivalent, the balance in the unemployment account determines whether people 
 
14 To see this, note that in the social insurance system, the net present value of aggregate future benefit payments equals 
the net present value of aggregate future premiums. If we abstract from behavioral responses, the net present value of 
aggregate future benefits would remain unchanged in a system with individual saving accounts. Hence, the sum of the 
insurance tax and the mandatory saving contribution (in net present value terms) can only be equal to the social insurance 
premium if all the individual accounts end up with a zero balance. In the presence of heterogeneous households with 
different unemployment spells, the sum of the insurance tax and the private saving contribution should therefore exceed the 
social insurance premium. In exploring saving accounts for the Netherlands, Rezwani and Hendrix (2002) consider the same 
premium as under the social system, but they allow for lower benefit levels instead.  
15 A reduction in unemployment spells, however, can offset these negative implications and make the unemployed better off 
under a system of individual accounts.   
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have a higher or lower lifetime income under the system with saving accounts. Hence, people 
ending up with a small balance due to frequent unemployment spells will suffer from lower 
lifetime incomes. It benefits people who experience few unemployment spells over their life 
cycle. They no longer have to cover the benefits to those who now rely on self insurance.
16  
Feldstein and Altman (1998) have explored by how much redistribution can be reduced if 
individual saving accounts were introduced in the US. They compute the share of workers that 
will end up with a positive saving account at the end of their working life if the contribution rate 
is fixed at 4% of the wage rate. They find that 95% of all workers can rely on self insurance. 
The 5% that has to be bailed out collects about half of all unemployment benefits. Hence, the 
unemployment payroll tax can be halved. Feldstein and Altman do not include the implications 
of improved incentives to work in their analysis. This could potentially reduce unemployment 
(duration), thereby allowing for further reductions in the tax. According to the calculations of 
Feldstein and Altman, the three lowest income quintiles tend to be worse off under the new 
system, although the average income effects are small. The highest two quintiles experience a 
net gain.  
In analyzing individual saving accounts for Dutch UI, Rezwani and Hendrix (2002) find that 
almost half of the people in the Netherlands that receive unemployment benefits will have to 
rely on self insurance. This share is larger than in Feldstein’s calculations for the US, where he 
reports a share of 25% that needs a bailout. This difference can be explained by unemployment 
being more concentrated among a smaller group of people in the Netherlands. Indeed, De 
Koning et al. (1998) suggest that 60% of all unemployment benefits in the Netherlands is 
received by only 10% of the employees. This probably reflects the long unemployment 
duration, especially among elderly and unskilled workers.
17 
 
As a result, individual saving accounts in the Netherlands will probably allow for a smaller 
reduction in the insurance tax than in the US. 
Excessive savings 
Another implication of high mandatory contribution rates is that people are forced to save extra 
funds during their working life. These additional savings would be efficient if people 
underinvest initially. If this is not the case, however, savings will be inefficiently high. This 
 
16 Solidarity can be maintained by imposing a tax on (the return to) positive saving accounts and providing a subsidy to (the 
cost of) negative saving accounts, see also Orszag and Snower (1997). 
17 Another explanation is repeat unemployment spells, e.g. due to seasonal unemployment or temporary layoffs (i.e. people 
who are rehired by the same employer). This may apply in particular to some sectors, such as construction and agriculture. 
In light of the relatively small inflows in the Netherlands, repeat spells do not seem to be the main problem. According to 
OECD (2002b), it is of more importance in Canada and the US, where respectively 38% and 30% of total unemployment is 
estimated to be due to temporary lay offs. To compare, temporary layoffs in Denmark and Austria are estimated at 20%, 
while for Sweden it is only 10%.   
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makes individual precautionary savings less efficient than risk pooling.
18 Indeed, under the 
latter regime there is no need to accumulate an inefficiently high stock of capital to cover the 
potential risk of unemployment. There are two ways to relax the problem of oversavings. First, 
saving accounts can be applied on top of a basic level of insurance. In that case, social UI is 
largely maintained at a certain level and duration of benefits. There is no need to allow for 
negative accounts as long as this minimum is sufficiently high. Individual accounts (mandatory 
or voluntary) may then provide supplementary benefits.  
A second way to relax the problem of oversavings is by integrating unemployment accounts 
with other saving accounts. For instance, Stiglitz and Yun (2002) suggest an integration of 
saving accounts for UI and retirement insurance.
19 Integration removes the need for creating a 
positive unemployment balance at the end of the working life as it can be compensated by the 
positive balance in the (early) retirement account. In fact, the (early) retirement account acts as 
collateral for a possibly negative unemployment account. In that case, smaller contribution rates 
can be used compared to separate accounts for unemployment and retirement. Stiglitz and Yun 
analyze the optimal share of the tax-funded insurance part of such an integrated system. 
Typically, a combination of contribution-funded individual savings and tax-funded social 
insurance is optimal. The tax-funded share is found to decline with the moral hazard effects and 
to increase with the magnitude of the risk and the degree of risk aversion. Stiglitz and Yun 
argue that integration with other schemes, such as disability and sickness schemes, is also 
desirable, unless these risks are perfectly correlated. Moreover, funds might be used for 
schooling or training, either to prevent unemployment or to increase the job-finding 
probabilities for the unemployed (see also Orszag and Snower, 1997). 
Fölster et al. (2002) further explore the integration of schemes and perform an exercise for 
Sweden that is similar to what Feldstein and Altman did for the US. Thereby, they include other 
public schemes such as parental leave, sickness benefits, child benefits and housing subsidies. 
Moreover, the scheme is integrated with pensions. The system explored by Fölster et al. 
consists of mandatory individual saving accounts where withdrawals will only be allowed in 
case of pre-specified events. Fölster et al. assume that the current level of social premiums is 
maintained and partly transferred into mandatory saving contributions. In the analysis of Fölster 
et al., 12% of the individuals will have to be bailed out, while 88% is able to provide for self 
insurance. The system allows for a reduction in the tax rate by 13% points. Some groups that 
experience a high incidence of unemployment are worse off, however, and suffer from lower 
pensions.  
 
18 With perfect capital markets, this inefficiency may be removed as households may borrow funds during their working life, 
thereby using their mandatory saving account as collateral. The inefficiency therefore depends on capital market 
imperfections. 
19 The switch towards funding would also cause transitional problems. These can be relaxed if the government controls the 
accounts. Indeed, the accounts can be notional and funding is no longer necessary as the government can operate the 
funds on a pay-as-you-go basis.  
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The example by Fölster et al. illustrates that the major share of social transfers in Sweden 
involves redistribution among individuals with high lifetime incomes. Indeed, Fölster (2001) 
finds that only 25% of all social transfers is interpersonal redistribution. The remaining 75% is 
intrapersonal redistribution and involves income smoothing over an individuals life cycle via 
social transfer schemes. For the Netherlands, Nelissen (1998) arrives at a similar result. He 
finds that the system of social security in the Netherlands reduces income inequality (measured 
by the Theil coefficient) on an annual basis by 45%, but on a lifetime basis by only 15%.
20 This 
suggests that only one third of all redistribution on an annual basis also involves redistribution 
on a lifetime basis. Regarding UI, Nelissen reports a reduction in the Theil coefficient of 0.9% 
on an annual basis and 0.3% on a lifetime basis. Again, it suggests that the share of 
interpersonal redistribution through UI is only one third of the total amount of redistribution in 
unemployment schemes.   
Summing up 
Individual saving accounts provide better incentives to avoid moral hazard, but come at the cost 
of less insurance. The accounts maintain, however, liquidity insurance and protect the income 
of people with the lowest lifetime incomes. Less risk pooling among people with high lifetime 
incomes introduce new inefficiencies. For instance, mandatory contributions may cause 
excessive savings. This can be mitigated by only partially replacing insurance by savings and/or 
by linking saving accounts for unemployment to other accounts, such as early retirement. 
3.3  Incentives for employers  
Ex-ante moral hazard on the side of employers leads to excessive inflows into unemployment 
schemes. There exist two ways to reduce this form of moral hazard: employment protection and 
experience rating. Reducing inflows via these measures, however, tends to reduce the job-
finding probabilities for the unemployed. 
Employment protection 
The tax character of the insurance premiums implies that there is no direct link between the 
premiums paid by individual employers and the number of job layoffs they create. This may 
lead to inefficient lay-off decisions as firms fail to internalize the cost of job layoffs associated 
with UI. In a stylized benchmark model, Blanchard and Tirole (2004) formalize this argument. 
They show that it is optimal to impose a layoff tax on firms that fully covers the unemployment 
benefit of the dismissed worker. Intuitively, by introducing a layoff tax (or requiring severance 
payments), efficiency in the layoff decision of the firm is improved as it now internalizes the 
 
20 This figure refers to the cohort of 1950 in the analysis of Nelissen. If we take the cohort of 1930, the difference is smaller: 
lifetime income inequality is then reduced by 30% through the social security system.  
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costs of UI.
21 Although Blanchard and Tirole note that the real world deviates from their 
stylized benchmark model in several ways, it clearly illustrates the main argument in favour of 
financial incentives to employers to internalize the social costs of layoff decisions.  
Severance payments as discussed by Blanchard and Tirole are part of a broader concept of 
employment protection legislation (EPL). A number of authors have stressed the relationship 
between EPL and UI. For instance, Pissarides (2001) considers EPL as an alternative form of 
insurance against the risk of job loss. This is because severance payments and notice periods 
guarantee a smoother income stream and reduce the risk of layoff. This reduces the need for UI 
(see the Box ‘Are EPL and UI substitutes?’).  
Are EPL and UI substitutes? 
Using an overall EPL indicator developed by the OECD, we have computed the correlation of EPL with a summary 
indicator for the net replacement rate in the 15 older EU countries at the end of the 1990s (see OECD, 2002a and 
2004). We find a correlation coefficient of − 0.49. This suggests that EPL and the generosity of UI are substitutes: 
countries adopting stronger dismissal restrictions have less generous UI programs and vice versa. To illustrate, the 
Scandinavian countries feature relatively moderate EPL and combine this with generous unemployment benefits. In 
contrast, Southern European countries have the opposite combination. The combination between EPL and UI is fairly 
constant across time in most countries. Reforms in EPL that have been implemented were usually limited to new 
contract types for new hires, rather than for regular workers. Note that the negative relationship between EPL and 
replacement rates is less robust for the OECD as a whole. Indeed, the correlation coefficient drops to − 0.08 if all OECD 
countries are included in the sample. This is because countries like Australia, Canada and the US combine liberal 
regimes of EPL with lower than average unemployment benefits. By including not only the benefit replacement rate but 
also the coverage of unemployment benefits, however, Boeri et al. (2004) report a stronger negative correlation of 
− 0.55 between EPL and benefit generosity.  
 
Many studies have explored whether EPL provides an efficient form of insurance against 
unemployment risk. On the one hand, by increasing firing costs EPL reduces inflows into 
unemployment and ceteris paribus raises aggregate employment.
22 Moreover, by reducing the 
hold-up problem between workers and firms, it may encourage investments in firm-specific 
human capital, thereby boosting productivity. This may become more important in a 
knowledge-based society. On the other hand, by reducing job mobility EPL reduces the 
incentive for workers to invest in general skills. Hence, whereas EPL raises investment in 
specific knowledge, it reduces investment in general human capital. This renders the impact on 
productivity ambiguous. Moreover, increased firing costs makes firms more reluctant to hire 
new workers since it makes an eventual dismissal more costly. This reduces the job-finding 
probabilities for the unemployed. Indeed, EPL tends to reduce outflows from unemployment, 
thereby causing longer unemployment duration and lower aggregate employment. Hence, 
 
21 The impact of a layoff tax may differ from severance payment since the former accrues to the government, while the latter 
accrues to the employee.  
22 Calculating the correlation between the indicator for EPL and inflows into UI (see figure 3.2) yields a coefficient of − 0.82.  
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whereas high and long-lasting unemployment benefits reduce the incentives to exit 
unemployment, EPL reduces the opportunities to exit unemployment by protecting insiders 
against the risk of unemployment. This holds especially for specific vulnerable groups such as 
ethnic minorities, long-term unemployed, and partially disabled workers. It may also reduce 
labour supply through the discouraged worker effect, especially of young workers and women 
who want to (re-)enter the labour market.  
Hence, while EPL lowers unemployment by reducing inflows, it raises unemployment by 
reducing outflows. Overall, the impact of EPL on unemployment is ambiguous. It 
unambiguously reduces job flows, however. The empirical literature confirms these theoretical 
notions. It reveals ambiguous results on the impact of EPL on the level of unemployment (Boeri 
and Jimeno-Serrano, 2003). This impact is not neutral with respect to different groups. Indeed, 
OECD (2004) finds that EPL increases employment among prime-age men and low-skilled 
workers, but reduces employment among prime-age women and youth employment. Strict EPL 
may therefore explain the relatively low participation of women and the high rate of youth 
unemployment in a number of EU countries. Empirical studies unambiguously reveal that EPL 
reduces flows on the labour market (Bertola, 1990). This latter causes increased unemployment 
duration, which exacerbates inequities in life-time incomes.
23 Hence, to the extent that there is a 
trade-off in protecting workers between EPL and UI, the latter fits better with the need for more 
mobility and more flexible labour reallocations.  
Experience rating 
In the US, the UI premiums are characterized by experience rating. It contains a striking 
similarity with the severance payments discussed above (although premiums do not directly 
accrue to the laid off workers). In particular, experience rating implies that UI premiums for 
firms are proportional to the historical number of job separations. Employers thus contribute to 
the payment of unemployment benefits that they create through their layoff decisions, albeit 
with a time lag. In a sense, firms thus bear the financial risk of unemployment.  
A number of studies have explored the implications of experience rating for the labour 
market. Millard and Mortensen (1997) show that the replacement of social insurance by 
experience rating has the same consequences as a combination of increased firing costs and 
decreased payroll taxes. In principle, this exerts an ambiguous effect on the labour market. 
Indeed, while lower payroll taxes typically increase employment, an increase in firing costs 
reduces both job creation and job destruction. The impact of this on unemployment is not a 
priori clear.
24 Yet, it unambiguously raises unemployment duration as increased firing costs 
 
23 Another effect of EPL is that it strengthens the bargaining position of insiders compared to outsiders. In this way, it raises 
wage claims and increases unemployment. Moreover, it may affect the inflow in other insurance schemes such as disability 
that are potentially less costly for firms. 
24 As a complement to a fine on job layoffs, one may consider a bonus on job hiring as part of an optimal institutional 
structure (Mortensen, 1994). Indeed, a bonus can restore the adverse incentive effects on job hiring imposed by firing costs.  
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benefit insiders at the expense of outsiders. Based on simulations with an efficiency wage 
model, Albrecht and Vroman (1999) suggest that the combined effect of higher firing costs and 
lower payroll taxes is likely to be a reduction in unemployment and a rise in production. 
Recently, Cahuc and Malherbet (2004) support these findings in a model of a typical European 
labour market that includes firing costs and a minimum wage. Alessi and Bloemen (2003) also 
report positive effects of the introduction of experience rating on employment in the 
Netherlands, especially for older workers who face a relatively high probability of being laid 
off. Alessi and Bloemen also find that experience rating redistributes the cost of UI across 
sectors since inflows differ substantially. 
Empirical studies for the US confirm the favourable impact of experience rating on 
unemployment. Feldstein (1978) was the first to show this. In particular, in the US not all 
unemployment benefits are financed by experience rated premiums. Indeed, constraints on firm 
possibilities to pay the premiums, e.g. due to bankruptcy, implies that additional payroll taxes 
are required. Moreover, US states adopt minimum and maximum premiums imposed on firms. 
As a result, there is only imperfect experience rating. The part of unemployment benefits that is 
financed by payroll taxes is referred to as a subsidy on job layoffs. By exploiting differences 
between US states, Feldstein finds that half of the temporary job layoffs in the US can be 
explained by this subsidy. Later, Topel (1983) did a similar exercise and arrives at a figure of 
30%, while Anderson and Meyer (1994) find 20%. Although the studies thus differ in the effect 
sizes, they consistently reveal a negative impact of experience rating on inflows into 
unemployment in the US. 
Despite its presumed favourable effects on employment, experience rating in UI is 
uncommon in the European Union. The reason is perhaps that a number of qualifications can be 
made to the above results. First, experience rating implies that firms bear the risk of 
unemployment. They thus act as the insurer of job separation risks, even if layoffs are beyond 
their control, e.g. due to a recession. The theoretical studies discussed above assume that firms 
are risk neutral so that they can indeed take over the role of the insurer. However, if firms 
would be risk averse – which seems to apply at least to small firms – it is costly to let firms bear 
the risk of unemployment. Holmlund (2001) adds that experience rating can be unattractive in 
the presence of sector-specific shocks. Indeed, it would place the entire burden of such a shock 
on firms operating in the shrinking sector. This may reinforce the magnitude of such shocks by 
speeding up bankruptcies, and perhaps even exacerbate swings in the business cycle. An 
optimal system is therefore likely to provide some degree of risk pooling, both among firms and 
among sectors. 
Secondly, by making firms responsible for the financing of unemployment benefits they 
create, experience rating gives them an interest to track laid off workers during their 
unemployment spell and to monitor their search efforts. Although this may help to increase exit  
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rates, monitoring can be organized more efficiently in specialized agencies or by a state agency 
that can exploit economies of scale, e.g. due to informational advantages from other sources.  
Thirdly, in an imperfect labour market, severance payments or employment protection 
strengthen the bargaining power of workers relative to employers. Through this general 
equilibrium effect, experience rating would induce higher wage claims, decrease job creation 
and raise unemployment.  
Finally, European labour markets are characterized by higher firing costs than the US labour 
market. This is due to employment protection legislation and severance payments in case of job 
layoffs. As a result, temporary job layoffs are not a central feature of European unemployment. 
More generally, large inflows do not constitute the major problem in Europe. Rather, the 
problem is long-term unemployment due to small outflows out of unemployment. As 
experience rating tends to reduce job creation, it is likely to increase  unemployment duration 
by worsening the labour market prospects of outsiders. As a result, this may also reduce 
effective labour supply through the discouraged worker effect. Rather than imposing it on top of 
EPL, Europe may therefore consider a replacement of EPL by experience rating.  
Summing up 
Layoff decisions by firms can be inefficient in the absence of firing costs. Therefore, it can be 
welfare improving to introduce employment protection or experience rating. In the US, 
experience rating makes firms responsible for financing the unemployment benefits of their laid 
off workers. It is found that this reduces temporary job layoffs. In Europe, however, experience 
rating is likely to yield more ambiguous results, especially since it would come on top of pre-
existing employment protection. By reducing job creation and job turnover, excessive firing 
costs exacerbate distortions in exit from UI. As this tends to be the main problem in European 
labour markets, experience rating is likely to play a more limited role in optimal European UI 
scheme than in the US.   
3.4  Contract enforcement 
The government may improve the trade-off between insurance and incentives by a better use of 
information, i.e. better registration of the unemployed and effectively imposing and enforcing 
eligibility conditions. Indeed, recipients of unemployment benefits can be forced to take 
sufficient action in applying for vacancies and to accept suitable job offers. To that end, the 
unemployment agency may collect information on search behaviour, engage in counselling and 
monitoring activities, and apply sanctions if an unemployed individual violates the rules. 
In this way, it can combine high benefit levels with less moral hazard. It also prevents the 
voluntary unemployed from collecting unemployment benefits.   
  27 
Monitoring and job search requirements 
The theoretical literature reveals that more stringent job search requirements can have two types 
of implications for the labour market (Boone and Van Ours, 2000). First, there is a deterrence 
effect on the employed: people with a job will increase their work effort so as to reduce the 
probability of being laid off. Indeed, the employed realize that they cannot just enjoy leisure 
when being laid off, but have to comply with the job search requirements. This makes 
unemployment a less attractive option. Second, job search requirements increase the search 
intensity of those already unemployed.  
A number of empirical studies for the US and the UK have explored this latter impact of job 
search requirements, i.e. the effects on the search intensity of the unemployed and on exit rates 
out of unemployment. These studies usually explore the combined impact of job search 
assistance (or counselling) and the monitoring associated with it. Most studies find a significant 
positive impact of more stringent job search requirements on search activities and exit rates (see 
the review by Fredriksson and Holmlund, 2003). For the Netherlands, estimates by Gorter and 
Kalb (1996) reveal that job search assistance indeed significantly raises the number of job 
applications. Van den Berg and Van der Klaauw (2004) find, however, that counselling and 
monitoring have been ineffective to raise exit rates in the Netherlands during the late 1990s. 
They argue that this is because people who face more stringent formal job search requirements 
will substitute away from informal search channels. The overall search efforts will thus remain 
unchanged. This substitution is, however, especially important when labour-market prospects 
are good, i.e. during an upswing and for individuals with favourable job-market characteristics. 
In the presence of poor labour-market prospects, it is likely that substitution between search 
channels is less important and that monitoring is more effective. Moreover, Van den Berg and 
Van der Klaauw (2004) argue that highly intensive job search assistance programs are more 
effective to increase the exit rate out of unemployment, although a large share of this increase 
might be due to the threat of the program rather than because of the counselling effect. 
Sanctions 
A sanction usually takes the form of a punitive reduction in benefits for some period of time. 
Sanctions have become an increasingly important tool in many OECD countries (Grubb, 2000). 
For instance, between 1987 and 1994 the number of sanctions in the Netherlands almost 
quadrupled from 27 000 to 104 000. After 1996, the ratio of sanctions to benefits rose from 
17% in 1996 to an average of 25% in 2000. Sanctions in the form of lower benefits turn out to 
be effective to increase the transition from unemployment into employment. Indeed, Abbring et 
al. (2000) find that a reduction in unemployment benefits due to sanctions substantially raises 
the exit rate out of unemployment in the Netherlands. In particular, benefit reductions in the 
order of 5 to 35% increase re-employment rates by 58% for males and 67% for females on 
average. The implied elasticity of the benefit level is estimated at 3, i.e. a 1% reduction in the  
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benefit due to a punitive sanction raises the re-employment rate by 3%. A related article by Van 
den Berg et al. (2002) explores the impact of sanctions in Dutch social assistance schemes. 
Sanctions are usually below 20% of the benefit level and are applied for only one or two 
months. Nevertheless, the transition rate from social assistance into work almost doubles when 
a sanction is imposed.  
Workfare 
An alternative way to reduce moral hazard in the presence of high benefit levels is workfare. It 
means that the government offers a job to all unemployed individuals in exchange for an 
unemployment benefit. In case of a job refusal, the unemployed person will no longer receive a 
benefit. Even if the jobs in workfare programs are not productive, workfare may be effective to 
avoid moral hazard associated with the collection of unemployment benefits by voluntary 
unemployed. Indeed, workfare introduces self selection as the unemployed who feature a high 
preference for leisure will drop out of the UI scheme. Especially when the government finds it 
difficult to distinguish between voluntary and involuntary unemployment, this self selection 
device may help to avoid abuse of unemployment schemes. 
Empirical studies show that mandatory participation in workfare programs indeed 
significantly reduces the duration of unemployment, either by raising the exit into employment 
or through exclusion. Black et al. (2003) find, however, that the largest share of the effect 
occurs even before the workfare begins. This suggests that the threat of participating in such a 
program is particularly effective in reducing unemployment duration. In addition, deterrence of 
people in work may further reduce the inflow of people into unemployment. Whether workfare 
is the most efficient way to encourage employment, however, is questionable as people may get 
locked in these programs. Thus, they can reduce effective labour supply, thereby crowding out 
private sector employment.  
Transaction costs 
Although job search requirements, monitoring, sanctions and workfare seem effective in 
reducing unemployment duration, it does not come free. Indeed, monitoring and workfare 
impinge upon privacy and involves high transaction costs. To illustrate, the administrative costs 
associated with UI in the Netherlands run up to € 600 billion in 2001, which equals almost 30% 
of the total UI bill in that year. These administrative costs, as well as decreasing returns to 
counselling and monitoring, restrict the use of these instruments for improving the trade-off 
between insurance and incentives. In a sense, it suggests that there is a trade-off in avoiding 
moral hazard between, on the one hand, improving incentives at the cost of less insurance and, 
on the other hand, enforcing efficient behaviour at substantial administrative costs.  
In the Netherlands, sanctions are of limited size and duration. Indeed, fines in UI usually 
vary between 5 and 20% of the benefit level and last for only one or two months. From the  
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theory of optimal law enforcement (Becker, 1968) follows that more costly monitoring 
increases the optimal size of a sanction in order to enforce the law. Van Ours (2003) therefore 
argues that there may be room for improving the enforcement of UI in the Netherlands by 
increasing the magnitude of sanctions or extending their duration. Although this reduces type II 
errors, it increases the size of type I errors though.  
Summing up 
To improve the trade-off between insurance and incentives, the government can increase job 
search requirements, intensify monitoring, raise sanctions and introduce workfare. Empirical 
evidence suggests that these measures are indeed effective in raising exit rates out of 
unemployment. It introduces, however, a new trade-off in reducing moral hazard, namely 
between administrative costs and reduced insurance.  
4  Rethinking Dutch unemployment insurance 
4.1  The current system 
In the Netherlands, a termination of a job contract can be obtained via two channels. First, it can 
occur via an administrative process of the Labour Office. This requires an advance notice 
period, which makes this procedure rather lengthy. Moreover, the firm must offer sufficiently 
important reasons for terminating the contract and it has to follow a number of criteria that aim 
to protect certain employees, such as older workers. The second route to terminate a job 
contract is much quicker, less cumbersome and runs via a local court. Usually, the court adopts 
a severance pay formula that provides for one month of salary per year of service. This makes 
the court-route usually more expensive for employers, although severance payments can also be 
granted under the procedure of the Labour Office. About half of the dismissals in the 
Netherlands are settled by the court route. The high severance payments contribute to overall 
strictness of employment protection legislation (EPL) in the Netherlands, especially for older 
workers. Compared to other OECD countries, this makes EPL rather strict for permanent 
workers. For temporary forms of employment, however, EPL is less strict as no severance pay 
is provided. 
After a Dutch worker has been laid off, he or she is entitled to wage related benefit schemes 
if a number of entitlement conditions are fulfilled. First, the worker has to face a specific 
reduction in his original working hours. This implies that individuals receiving unemployment 
benefits may still have still have part-time work. A second condition is that the individual 
should have worked for at least 52 days during 4 out of the past 5 calendar years. Moreover, the 
unemployed worker must have had a job for at least 26 weeks in the past 39 weeks prior to the 
start of the unemployment period.   
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Unemployment benefits in the Netherlands equal 70% of the wage in the job prior to 
unemployment, with a certain maximum benefit level per day. In practice, net replacement rates 
in the Netherlands can be higher due to severance payments from previous employers that 
provide for supplementary payments. Thus, as benefits come from different sources, UI does 
not meet the exclusivity condition mentioned in section 2. Moreover, various income-related 
transfer schemes imply especially high net replacement rates for low-skilled workers. The 
duration of the benefit period lies between 6 months and 5 years, depending on the employment 
history of the unemployed worker. For an entitlement period of 5 years, the unemployed worker 
must have had jobs for 40 years. After the expiration of unemployment benefits, the 
unemployed may receive welfare benefits that are means tested on household income and 
household wealth (if a person is younger than 50). Welfare benefits are related to the social 
minimum income, rather than final pay. 
To be eligible to unemployment benefits, an unemployed person has to meet a number of 
obligations. First, a dismissed worker is obliged to prevent unnecessary job loss. Second, he or 
she should take actions to prevent staying unemployed by searching for a job and accepting 
appropriate job offers. Third, the unemployed have to register as a job searcher at the public 
employment office and participate in education and training. To monitor all this, benefit 
recipients have to keep the local UI agency informed about everything that is relevant to the 
payment of the unemployment benefits. If an unemployed worker does not comply to these 
rules, the local UI agency is authorized to apply a sanction.  
Dutch UI benefits are financed from two sources. The first six months of unemployment 
benefits are financed from a sector specific fund. Premiums differ between sectors and are paid 
by the employer. Hence, to a certain degree premiums are experience rated at the sectoral level. 
Benefits for unemployment after six months are financed by a general fund which collects 
general unemployment premiums from both employers and employees. In 2004, this premium 
equals 5.8% for the employee and 1.55% for the employer. The insurance premium is applied to 
wages that lie between a daily level of € 58 and € 167. Outside this range, no insurance 
premiums are collected.    
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Figure 4.1  Unemployment compensation in % of GDP and standardized unemployment rate, figures 2002 
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Source: OECD Employment Outlook 2004 
 
In 2002, the Netherlands spends 1.72% of its GDP on unemployment benefits. Compared to 
other EU countries, this is a relatively large amount. Of the countries presented in figure 4.1, 
only Germany spends more on unemployment compensation, namely 2.1% of GDP. The figure 
for the Netherlands is particularly striking in light of the low official unemployment rate. One 
reason for this is that the number of people receiving unemployment compensation is 
substantially larger than the number of people that are registered as unemployed. For instance, 
in 2002 551 000 people collected unemployment or social assistance benefits while only 
302 000 were officially unemployed, i.e. actively searching for work. This discrepancy arises 
because people receiving unemployment benefits who are older than 55 were not obliged to 
search for work until recently. 
4.2  A historical perspective 
Trends affect the circumstances under which unemployment schemes are designed. In the past 
two decades, this has lead to a number of reforms in Dutch UI. Below, we demonstrate these 
reforms and their background.  
During the 1960s and 1970s, the Dutch welfare state expanded rapidly. In the early 1980s, 
Dutch unemployment benefit replacement rates were as high as 80%. In response to the 
disastrous development of public finances and the poor performance of the Dutch labour 
market, however, the government reduced this level to 70% in the 1980s.   
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In the late eighties, benefit duration for the young was reduced while for the elderly it was 
increased. At the same time, workers older than 57.5 who were laid off were no longer required 
to search for work. Their benefits were even extended to the age of 65. Accordingly, UI was 
largely used as a scheme for early retirement. As a result, unemployment duration of the elderly 
in the Netherlands is substantial compared to other workers, while outflows are small (see table 
4.1).   
 
Table 4.1  Inflows, outflows and duration of unemployment insurance, figures 2001 
Age  Inflow in % all workers  Outflow in % benefit 
recipients 
Average duration in 
months 
       
15-24  2.9  43.0  2.7 
25-34  5.1  38.9  4.4 
35-44  4.5  37.0  5.9 
45-54  4.6  31.2  7.4 
55-58  4.8  19.4   
58-64  5.9  4.4  25.0 
       
Total  4.4  30.6  7.5 
       
Source: Rezwani and Hendrix (2002) and Van Ours (2003) 
 
In the 1990s, there was increased attention for abuse in social insurance schemes, which 
threatened the legitimacy of the system. As a response, monitoring and sanctions in UI were 
intensified. Especially the new law of 1996 focused on reducing moral hazard by means of 
more effective law enforcement. At the same time, active job search assistance and 
reintegration efforts increased the obligations for the unemployed to find work. This improved 
the trade-off between incentives and insurance and helped to maintain public support for the 
system. It increased, however, administrative costs. Indeed, while administrative costs were 
about € 0.2 billion in 1991 (10% of the total amount of benefit payments in that year), this rose 
to  € 0.6 billion in 2001 (30% of the benefits).  
Until now, dismissed workers who are not entitled to wage related unemployment benefits 
are entitled to short-period benefits during six months at a level of 70% of the minimum wage. 
Budgetary needs made the current administration decide to abolish these short-term benefits 
from 2005 onwards. Moreover, entitlement conditions will become more stringent by requiring 
employment during 39 out of 52 weeks prior to the job layoff, instead of 26 out of 39 weeks. 
These two measures will primarily affect young people, who already receive little insurance 
against unemployment risk. 
The current government has also reduced the generosity of UI for elderly workers. In 
particular, elderly workers are now obliged to search for work in order to maintain eligibility for 
unemployment benefits. Moreover, benefit extensions – that apply when wage related benefit  
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duration has expired – have been abolished. For some elderly, this implies that benefit duration 
has been cut by up to 3.5 years. In this way, the government aims to encourage labour-market 
participation of workers older than 55, which is now below 40% in the Netherlands. The 
problem of using UI as an early retirement route may become more pressing in the near future 
as the share of elderly in the workforce increases. At the same time eligibility criteria for 
disability insurance and early retirement schemes are tightened. Accordingly, there is a fear that 
private insurance companies will try to put disabled people in public unemployment schemes.  
4.3  The need for reform 
Today’s problem with UI in the Netherlands is primarily the small outflows, either because of 
poor incentives or due to small job-finding probabilities. This holds in particular for the elderly, 
low-skilled workers and non-western immigrants. Indeed, these groups experience substantially 
longer unemployment duration than the average unemployed person in the Netherlands 
(Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment, 2004). Future trends in society may exacerbate 
these problems. For instance, an increasing share of elderly people in the labour force exerts 
pressure on UI as long as the elderly feature a high incidence of unemployment. This may 
reinforce the intergenerational conflict as young generations would face increasing costs to 
cover the public expenditures geared to the elderly. The conflict becomes particularly 
pronounced to the extent that UI is used as a publicly financed early retirement route. In light of 
the privatization of disability insurance and the abolishment of fiscal subsidies for early 
retirement savings, this problem may well intensify in the coming decades.  
Skill-biased technological change may exacerbate the problem of low-skilled 
unemployment. Indeed, new technologies may raise the demand for high skilled workers more 
than the supply of skills can facilitate. Accordingly, wage inequality will grow. As long as 
minimum wages and welfare benefits are indexed to the average wage in the economy, an 
increasing number of low-skilled workers will be laid off and become unemployed. Thus, the 
high incidence of unemployment among the low skilled will increase further.  
De Mooij and Tang (2003) argue that a number of trends put a strain on the Dutch welfare 
state in the coming decades. This may also call for further reform in UI. For instance, ageing 
raises public expenditures on old-age pensions and health care, which tends to increase the 
already high tax burden in the Netherlands. At the same time, various developments render it 
more difficult to raise these taxes by threatening the tax base. For instance, ageing reduces 
participation as measured over the entire population. Moreover, the distortionary consequences 
of taxation increase due to high capital mobility and a more flexible labour market. 
Accordingly, public funds will become scarcer. This increases the need for efficiency-
enhancing reforms that reduce the size of public expenditures, including social UI.  
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The expansion of female labour-market participation may also reduce the need for social 
insurance. Indeed, couples can provide implicit insurance against the loss of one income in a 
two-earner household. This may reduce public support for social insurance. Yet, 
individualization implies that an increasing number of households will rely on explicit 
insurance. Yet, in a more heterogeneous labour market with diverse households, it becomes 
increasingly difficult to distinguish between voluntary job quits and involuntary layoffs. This 
can threaten the legitimacy of the system by increasing the risk of non-compliance.  
Also human capital is important for UI in the future. To the extent that general skills become 
more important in an economy characterized by creative destruction and innovation, a flexible 
labour market in which job turnover is high is desirable. People then need general skills to 
quickly adapt to booming sectors. UI would be a way to facilitate the process of job creation 
and job destruction that is accompanied by short-term unemployment spells. If specific human 
capital becomes more important, however, in an economy is characterized by specialization, 
long-term and stable relationships and high internal flexibility of firms, then it would be optimal 
to rely more on employment protection.  
4.4  Future unemployment insurance in the Netherlands 
This section elaborates on three directions for reform of Dutch UI. These directions can be 
interpreted as scenarios, based on different priorities in society. The aim of the scenarios is to 
discuss how the various parameters of UI can be combined in a coherent future system that 
emphasizes particular values. Thus, we can also illustrate important trade-offs. The scenarios 
are described in qualitative terms and are dubbed: Protection, Exit, and Incentives. 
Protection 
In the first scenario, the Dutch government remains responsible for UI. The current level and 
duration of benefits are maintained. As disability insurance is partly shifted to the private sector 
and subsidies for early retirement are abolished, there is increasing pressure to use UI as an exit 
route for older workers. Indeed, private insurers have an incentive to reduce disability claims by 
moving the elderly to UI. This pressure is even more pronounced due to a rising share of elderly 
workers in the workforce, combined with the high incidence of (long-term) unemployment 
among the elderly. The government responds by introducing a system of experience rating in 
UI. This makes it more costly for employers to lay off (older) workers, which reduces inflows 
into UI. 
Although elderly unemployed are obliged to search for work, little job-finding probabilities 
and small incentives to search cause long spells of unemployment, usually until the retirement 
age. This is exacerbated by experience rating, which reduces the job-finding probabilities for 
the elderly. Tough employment protection keep wages for elderly workers relatively high and  
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rigid. This further reduces the job finding probabilities for the unemployed elderly. Only the 
mandatory retirement age provides some relief for firms to separate older workers at low cost.  
Also young people in the Netherlands receive more protection against the risk of 
unemployment through experience rating. Moreover, the government relaxes entitlement 
conditions in UI, which provides better insurance for the young. It stimulates risk taking and 
improves the incentive to invest in specific human capital, thereby raising productivity. 
However, it makes it more difficult for the young to find a regular job. Hence, unemployment 
duration increases also for younger people. Moreover, labour supply is reduced through the 
discouraged worker effect.  
To reduce ex-post moral hazard, the government engages in extensive workfare and other 
active labour market policies. These policies, however, run into decreasing returns to scale and 
are ineffective in bringing elderly people back to work. Only for women do these policies help 
to reduce unemployment. Yet, they crowd out private sector employment by reducing effective 
labour supply for other jobs and are accompanied by substantial transaction costs. Overall, the 
rate and duration of unemployment increase in this scenario. 
Exit 
In the second scenario, UI is moderately reformed in the Netherlands. Rather than discouraging 
inflows into unemployment, the government in this scenario focuses more on stimulating 
outflows. Social benefits levels are maintained at 70% of the previous wage for unemployment 
spells up to six months.   
After the initial period of six months, the government guarantees a fixed minimum benefit 
that equals 70% of the minimum wage. These benefits are not means tested for household 
income or wealth. They last for an additional period that depends on employment history, but 
the maximum duration is one year. During this second phase (i.e. after the first six months), 
social partners in the Netherlands supplement the minimum benefits up to a maximum of 70% 
of the previous wage. To prevent additional supplements, the government does not provide 
welfare benefits if social partners agree upon supplementary insurance beyond this twelve 
month period. Note that the mutual responsibility for unemployment benefits by the 
government and social partners violates the exclusivity requirement. Hence, the efforts to 
combat moral hazard are suboptimal. 
The reduction in benefit duration encourages exit from unemployment, especially among 
older workers. Indeed, they face stronger incentives to avoid unemployment and to actively 
search for work. This increases job-finding probabilities for the elderly. The labour market for 
elderly workers becomes somewhat more flexible by allowing for wage reductions (without 
implications for pension rights), partial early retirement and lower severance payments for the 
elderly. The lower unemployment rate among older workers allows for lower premiums, which 
stimulates labour supply among the young.   
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UI agencies intensively monitor benefit claims to avoid moral hazard. Moreover, sanctions 
are increased in case of non-compliance and active labour market policies are extended. These 
efforts help to reduce unemployment duration and increase exit rates further. They cause, 
however, high transaction costs. Hence, a high tax burden remains necessary to cover the cost 
of administration, job search assistance and other active labour market policies.  
Employment protection remains important. This stimulates long-term relationships between 
employers and employees. Accordingly, firms and workers invest in specific human capital. It 
implies, however, that unemployment duration remains larger than in the US. 
Incentives 
Public support for social insurance declines under the influence of individualisation and the 
increasing number of two-earner couples. As a consequence, Dutch UI is reformed by partly 
replacing social insurance by individual saving accounts. In particular, during the first six 
months of unemployment, the government provides a fixed social unemployment benefit. The 
level is unrelated to previous earnings and equals 70% of the minimum wage.  
The premiums to finance unemployment benefits are partly experience rated. This provides 
a new form of employment protection that replaces current EPL in the Netherlands. It has the 
advantage of reducing transaction costs in case of dismissal. On balance, firing costs fall. This 
creates a more flexible labour market with increasing job flows and more investments in general 
skills. In a dynamic economy, high job-finding probabilities provide the best insurance against 
the risk of unemployment.  
Workers contribute mandatory premiums to individual saving accounts. They may draw 
from these accounts during the first six months of unemployment to supplement the public 
benefits. Moreover, they can rely on these accounts to cover the income loss during one 
additional year of unemployment. The saving account is linked to the early retirement account. 
Hence, the mandatory premiums can be modest as the early retirement account acts partly as 
collateral for a negative unemployment account. Thus, only few people will need a bailout as 
most end up with a positive balance at the end of their career. People suffering from a high 
incidence of unemployment, however, end up with few funds for early retirement. This 
increases the pressure on welfare and disability schemes.  
With the introduction of individual saving accounts, the insurance tax falls substantially. 
This encourages labour supply. Moreover, exit rates out of unemployment increase and 
unemployment duration falls among both elderly and young generations. Instead of active 
labour market policies, the government relies on incentives in the form of experience rating and 
self insurance to reduce moral hazard in UI. On balance, inflows remain largely unchanged 
although there is a shift from older to younger workers. Exit rates from unemployment schemes 
increase considerably.  
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These gains come at the expense of less insurance and more income inequality. Indeed, 
people suffering from long-term unemployment end up with smaller early retirement accounts. 
Yet, solidarity with the most vulnerable groups is maintained as people ending up with a 
negative balance are bailed out. Moreover, the opportunities to borrow in the individual saving 
accounts maintain liquidity insurance. 
5  Concluding remarks 
The literature on optimal unemployment insurance emphasises the trade-off between the 
benefits from insurance and the costs of moral hazard. Private insurance contains better 
incentives to reduce moral hazard by enforcing the optimal insurance contract. It runs the risk, 
however, of underinsurance due to selection. Moreover, as unemployment risks are correlated, 
private insurance faces some additional difficulties. This gives a rationale for social insurance.  
The public sector typically faces more difficulty than the private sector in containing moral 
hazard. To combat ex-ante moral hazard, it can focus on reducing inflows into unemployment 
by means of unemployment protection legislation or experience rating. This, however, tend to 
reduce job creation and increase unemployment duration. As long unemployment spells among 
particular groups, such as the elderly, the low-skilled and immigrants, is the main concern in the 
Netherlands, this does not seem the way forward in the coming decades.  
Increasing outflows from unemployment would call for more flexibility on the labour 
market, which would raise the job finding probabilities for the unemployed. Moreover, to 
improve incentives one may consider a reduction in benefit levels and benefit duration. As these 
measures are rather blunt cuts in insurance, individual saving accounts may help to make it 
feasible. Indeed, partially replacing insurance by mandatory individual savings would maintain 
liquidity insurance as well as solidarity with people featuring low lifetime incomes.  
One way to relax the trade-off between insurance and incentives is by intensive monitoring, 
sanction policies and workfare. These policies seem to have an impact on moral hazard and may 
be helpful to guide vulnerable groups back to the labour market. These policies, however, are 
expensive for the government and run the risk of quickly running into decreasing returns to 
scale.  
The last two decades, Dutch unemployment insurance has gradually been reformed: levels 
were reduced, entitlement and eligibility criteria tightened, and more emphasis has been put on 
sanctions, monitoring and activation. Future trends like aging, skill-biased technological 
change, more scarcity of public funds, growing heterogeneity and the increasing importance of 
human capital may call for further change in unemployment insurance in the coming decades. 
The most desirable way of reform depends on uncertain preferences and circumstances. The 
scenarios may help to explore the future in such uncertain world. 
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